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ABSTRACT
ASSESSING THE EFFECTS OF HEURISTIC PERCEPTIONS
ON VOTER TURNOUT
MAY 2016
AMANDA AZIZ, B.A., UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS AMHERST
M.A., UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS AMHERST
Directed by: Professor Scott Blinder
Democracy in the United States operates under two contradictory norms: that it is a
civic duty to vote, and that it is irresponsible to cast an uninformed vote. Do these
contrasting norms suppress voter turnout? Why do some uninformed Americans
turn out to vote while others do not? This study seeks to understand the
information barriers that Americans perceive to be in the way of voting by studying
how voters and nonvoters differ in their perceptions of the importance of various
heuristics. By analyzing a 2012 Cooperative Congressional Election Study survey
question that measures respondents’ prioritization of these information shortcuts,
this study is able to understand how the prioritization of certain heuristics is
associated with turnout rates. I find that high prioritization of the partisan
identification heuristic and the heuristic based on the candidate a respondent’s
friend supports is associated with higher turnout rates. I argue that this is because
of the density of information offered by each heuristic and their usefulness in aiding
in the decision-making process for potential voters. I conclude that perception of the
usefulness of heuristics matters to turnout, and that this is a start to understanding
how information costs may hinder turnout where it would otherwise exist.
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CHAPTER I
SUPPRESSED VOTER TURNOUT
Introduction
“As soon as you look at the civil and political society of the United States, you
discover two great facts that dominate all the others and from which the
others are derived. Democracy constitutes the social state; the dogma of the
sovereignty of the people, the political law . . . Sovereignty of the people is
always more or less a fiction wherever democracy is not established”
(Tocqueville 1835).
Popular sovereignty has been linked to democracy as a tenet of American
values and political life since the early years of the nation, yet in the modern era
citizen participation and voter turnout have declined—even though the proportion
of the population eligible to vote has increased through the passage of constitutional
amendments and voting rights legislation for women, blacks, and citizens at least 18
years of age. In a society where voting is considered a civic duty, why have turnout
rates been declining as the electorate is growing?
One reason for this counterintuitive situation could be the fact that although
“the right to vote is regarded with reverence in American civic culture” (Rolfe 2012
7), there is a counter-norm working against it that enforces the idea that it is
irresponsible to cast an uninformed vote. Lack of information is seen as something
that must be “overcome” in order for many citizens to vote (Lupia 1994a; Lupia
1994b; Lupia and McCubbins 1998), and low-information voters who are unreliable,
irrational, and have inconsistent ideologies and opinions regarding issues and
candidates have become the focus of many critiques of democracy (Campbell et. al
1960; Converse 1964; Zaller 1992). Voting has been a right that enfranchised
citizens have enjoyed since the founding and one that has been fought for by many
1

demographics throughout our nation’s history. It is a practice that has been viewed
as an act of patriotism among the American public for decades. In a New York Times
poll from 1983, 83% of respondents said that voting was a sign of patriotism
(Yankee Doodle Polling 2015). In a 2002 poll from the Harwood Institute, 97% of
respondents agreed that voting was an important part of patriotism (Yankee Doodle
Polling 2015). In a 2014 Fox News poll 93% of respondents considered voting in
elections an act of patriotism (Yankee Doodle Polling 2015). “Voting” topped the list
of patriotic acts in the first two polls while it was nudged out by one percentage
point by “flying an American flag” in the Fox News poll. Where “joining the armed
forces” was an available option, voting was seen as more patriotic (Yankee Doodle
Polling 2015).
As voting is the only way to have citizens’ preferences implemented in
legislation, low turnout rates have concerned both American citizens as well as
scholars of American politics for many years (Merriam and Gosnell 1924; Aldrich
1993; Rosenstone and Hansen 1993; Brady et al. 1995; Rolfe 2012; Sinclair 2012).
While messages encouraging citizens to participate in their democracy and
campaigns that prompt people to register and “get out the vote” are common in
American society, messages discouraging uninformed, “irresponsible” voting have
become prominent on the Internet as well (Granderson 2011; McArdle 2014; Somin
2014; Gaughan 2015). In fact, in a November 2014 Huffington Post poll run by the
professional polling company YouGov which asked “Do you feel that all eligible
Americans should vote, or should people only vote if they are well-informed about
the election?” 46% responded, “all eligible American citizens should vote,” 42%
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responded, “only people who are well informed should vote,” and 12% were not
sure. However 60% of millennial respondents said, “only people who are well
informed should vote,” and the frequency of this response tapered off quickly as the
age demographic increased. Clearly the contrasting norms are at odds with each
other, and may originate from varying ideas about what constitutes a healthy
democracy. Although the origin of these norms is beyond the scope of this paper, it
is important to understand that the tension between voting and having enough
information to do so could be suppressing voter turnout where it would otherwise
exist.
Figure 1: Huffington Post/YouGov Poll November 2014

Figure 1. Depicts the frequency of responses to the question “Do you feel that all eligible Americans
should vote, or should people only vote if they are well-informed about the election?” according to
age group. Source: Huffington Post

How can Americans reconcile the norms that state it is a duty to vote but that
an uninformed vote is irresponsible? What exactly defines an informed vote in the
3

eyes of citizens? This is a question about information and the information barriers
that Americans might perceive stand in the way of voting. This project seeks to
understand how voters and nonvoters differ in their perceptions of the importance
or usefulness of various information shortcuts—heuristics. If we can understand
how these two groups look at heuristics differently, we may be able to understand
more about the information barriers that keep some people from turning out to vote
while others participate regularly.
This paper will evaluate the current literature on voter turnout in American
elections and heuristic processing among voters. In developing a heuristic-based
explanation for voter turnout, this paper will show that there is space for a new
theory at the intersection of these literatures, and support the importance of voter
turnout as a measure of the health of American democracy. Using data from the
Cooperative Congressional Election Study (CCES) 2012 public opinion survey, this
paper will investigate the perceptions of the importance of the following heuristics:
party identification, local newspaper endorsement, candidate occupation, candidate
gender, candidate race, the candidate a respondent’s friends support, and candidate
religion. CCES respondents were asked to rank the importance of each heuristic in
making a decision about which candidate to hypothetically vote for without having
any other information on the candidate. This survey question gives political
scientists a clear understanding of which decision-making aids respondents value. I
predict that there will be a difference between the types of heuristics that voters
and non-voters value, and these differences may help explain why some less
engaged citizens vote while others do not.
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Importance of Turnout
Voting is the bare minimum required for a democracy to run properly, and
therefore it is a particularly important component of political participation.
Additionally, unlike campaigning or donating, it is the only form of participation that
citizens feel a civic duty to fulfill (Rolfe 2012). It is “the most common and important
act of political participation in any democracy” (Aldrich 1993). In an ideal
democracy, politicians would be directly responsive to the citizens who vote for
them and citizens would be well informed and politically sophisticated enough to
choose candidates who represent their preferences in the legislature and hold them
accountable when they do not represent the interests of the citizens. Whether a
representative acts as a delegate or a trustee, there is ideally an understanding and
trust between the principal and agent, which citizens communicate by voting for a
candidate. Participation in a candidate’s campaign shows engagement with politics
but if no one turns out to vote for the candidate the campaign effort is in vain.
Monetary contributions may help a candidate buy more airtime on television and
attract citizen attention, but voting is the crucial step—citizens must make the
choice to turn out on Election Day in order for any of these gestures to count. With
turnout being such an important aspect of American democracy and the study of
American politics, it is problematic that so little has been studied in the area of
information-based or heuristic-based turnout.
Turnout Literature
The phenomenon of voter turnout has always been a salient research topic in
political science because of the correctly perceived importance of voting to the
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health of a democracy. Early research on voter turnout was especially concerned
with the normative value of voting and asked the question of why many Americans
neglected to fulfill their civic duty by abstaining from voting in various elections
(Merriam and Gosnell 1924). For years much of the voter turnout research sought to
address this normatively negative aspect of democracy, which placed nonvoters at
fault for not participating, and resulted in non-voters being painted in a negative
light (Rolfe 2012). With the introduction of a rational choice model of voter turnout,
the question of voter turnout became inverted so as to ask why anyone bothers to
vote in the first place (Downs 1957). Voter turnout seemed to be the paradox that
rational choice models could not address with the classic cost-benefit equation pB >
C until the inclusion of a duty term updated the equation to read pB + D > C, where
“duty” represents any additional benefit that a voter can obtain from voting, making
the benefit greater than the cost (Riker and Ordeshook 1968; Aldrich 1993). This
reinforced the normative value of voting as a civic “duty.” The rational choice model
led to research that was driven by the “cost” side of the voting equation. This is
where I believe a heuristic take on voter turnout may fit into the literature because
certain heuristics, as information shortcuts and decision-making aids, can lower the
information cost of voting for many citizens, making them feel as if they are
“informed voters” and potentially increase voter turnout by easing concerns about
the information-based counter-norm.
Political scientists sought to understand what exactly constituted the “cost”
of voting and what made this cost vary for different people. The resource model of
political participation was an important development that helped scholars
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understand how exactly socioeconomic status (SES) affects voting, monetary
contributions, and time-consuming political investments (Brady, Verba, &
Schlozman 1995). The model goes “beyond SES” by defining and measuring three
resources critical to political participation: time, money, and civic skills. The authors
find that for the act of voting, “seemingly the least demanding form of political
activity” (Brady et al. 1995 283), political interest and civic skills are the most
important resources needed or utilized to participate. However, both political
interest and civic skills are related to education and income. People with higher
levels of these resources are more likely to have a higher SES and a greater
opportunity to learn and develop civic skills as well as interact with a homogenous
group of people who can provide and receive political information in a feedback
loop. Scholars have understood the cost of voting to be a barrier to many Americans
and an important predictor of turnout. People for whom the cost of voting is
lower—whether this is an information cost or monetary cost—are more likely to
turn out to vote. Therefore people who can prioritize certain effective heuristics as
shortcuts and decision-making aids may be able to lower the cost of voting for
themselves, becoming more likely to vote and feel efficacious in their vote choice.
People of higher SES status who turn out to vote as a result of high civic skills
and political sophistication are parts of social networks that may also contain
nonvoters. The social context is therefore another important strand of voter turnout
literature. Social theories of voter turnout often include mobilization and canvassing
effects (Gerber & Green 2000; Nickerson 2008; Gerber et al. 2008; Rolfe 2012), but
also focus on the importance of cues exchanged within social networks (Rolfe 2012;
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Sinclair 2012). Elections and the act of voting do not occur within a vacuum, and the
decision to turn out is affected by many facets of political and social life. Although it
may be time consuming (and therefore costly) to go to the polls on Election Day,
voters are motivated by other factors: the “warm fuzzies” they experience after
fulfilling a civic duty, the social pressure to conform to this norm, and influences
from other voters—the people they interact with in their social networks (Sinclair
2012; Rolfe 2012). These social effects are often not found in rational choice and
cost-based research on voter turnout but they are important to consider—they may
themselves be information shortcuts that citizens consider when deciding whether
or not to vote. Citizens pick up on cues from their friends and coworkers and may
base the decision to vote and even base their vote choice on what they hear or see in
these networks.
Meredith Rolfe (2012) provides the most comprehensive version of this
social theory, which works on the individual and aggregate levels and provides a
strong tie between the importance of social networks and mobilization, truly
advancing her claim that all turnout is mobilized:
“Higher-intensity campaigns make politics and the upcoming election
more salient, not only in increased political discussion among friends,
but also in other prominent cues that may indicate to citizens that
their friends, neighbors, and coworkers care about the election.
Increases in media coverage, campaign signs, mail and phone contact
from candidates, and the like—all of these signals increase the size of
the effective reference group for any potential voter when making the
turnout decision. Thus, in effect, the social networks relevant to the
turnout decision become larger as mobilization increases the salience
of the election” (Rolfe 2012 100).
Rolfe argues that vote choices and even the choice to turn out to vote are
often products of social heuristics within social networks. She calls the users
8

of these social cues “conditional decision makers” who will make the decision
to vote when they are exposed to a certain amount of electoral information in
their social networks. These choices do not need to be conscious, but
conditional decision makers recognize these cues within their social network
based on the salience that campaigns generate around elections and make
the decision to vote based on the fact that other people they know are doing
so (Rolfe 2012 22). I would argue that these are social heuristics because
uninformed members of social networks receive information about friends’
vote choices and election activity and are able to infer how they should act
when it comes time to decide to turn out to vote. While the social theory is
less concerned with an individual’s resources and more focused on how their
networks influence them to turn out, it can still be considered on the
periphery of cost-centric theories of voter turnout because the cues and
shortcuts provided by the more politically active members of a social
network can lower the cost of voting for the less politically active or less
knowledgeable members of the group.
These existing theories of voter turnout are well thought out, empirically
solid, and extensive. They focus on voters and explain why citizens who vote do so.
However this paper is concerned with understanding how voters and nonvoters
perceive the usefulness of various heuristics and if these potential differences in
perception affect the likelihood of turning out. It asks a question about information
as a cost and heuristics as resources and cues in the eyes of potential voters, who
are “conditional decision-makers” (Rolfe 2012). Which heuristics do voters tend to
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find most compelling, compared to nonvoters? Do some people abstain from voting
because they feel they do not have enough information to do so? Or because they do
not know which shortcuts to use to effectively pick a candidate? Are they afraid that
their uninformed ballot is irresponsible?
Political scientists know that education and political sophistication do have
an effect on voter turnout and vote choice (Zaller 1992, Lassen 2005, Prior 2007),
mostly among the voting population, but we do not know how voters and nonvoters
differ in their perceptions of different information shortcuts. My heuristic-based
turnout explanation exists at this intersection of cost and information—the people
who perceive using certain heuristics as an effective way of making a decision see
the cost of voting to be lower than people who do not understand how to prioritize
useful heuristics. Heuristics can be helpful to many Americans in making decisions
to turn out to vote, but they may also benefit the more educated and politically
sophisticated population who can prioritize the heuristics that convey the most
useful information. This may allow higher SES people who are on the fence about
voting to correctly perceive which heuristics are most helpful in making a decision
to vote because they understand which political considerations are most important
in the process. They may also benefit from increased confidence in their actual vote
choice and feel like they are making an effective contribution to their democracy by
having some inferred information through a decision making aid rather than going
out to vote blindly. Essentially, each heuristic offers a shortcut to various types and
levels of information, and some are more useful than others when deciding whether
or not to vote. The people who perceive the more effective heuristics as being
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important are different than those people who prioritize inherently less effective
heuristics, and their turnout rates will reflect that.
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CHAPTER II
INFORMATION AND VOTING
Heuristics Literature
As has been previously alluded to, for the purposes of this paper “heuristics”
will be defined as information shortcuts or decision-making aids. They are pieces of
information but they are just small representations of the kinds of information one
can infer from them. They are useful because they “reduce the complex tasks of
assessing probabilities and predicting values to simpler judgmental operations”
(Tversky and Kahneman 1974 1124). For example, the party identification heuristic
is useful because knowing if a candidate is a Republican or a Democrat will give
many Americans an idea about where the candidate stands on a variety of issues. It
is one of the most effective heuristics a voter can use because it is informationdense: it offers a shortcut to concrete policy information and gives cues about where
candidates stand on a variety of issues. If a potential voter knows their own party
identification or that of their family, knowing this shortcut can help them make a
vote choice (Green, Palmquist, & Schickler 2002). The usefulness of this heuristic
does depend on a person’s partisan strength and their understanding of the values
of each party, however. A potential voter cannot see a candidate’s Democratic Party
identification and understand how that benefits them without first understanding
that they also identify as a Democrat. Indeed, studies have proven the importance of
the partisan heuristic through examination of nonpartisan local and state elections
in Illinois, Nebraska, Kansas, and North Carolina in which the removal or absence of
party identification suppressed turnout (Schaffner, Streb, & Wright 2001).
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While many academics and ordinary citizens lament the lack of political
interest and sophistication among the American public, some scholars point out
how unrealistic it is to expect Americans to know all the relevant information in a
given election, and these scholars advance the usefulness of heuristics in their
theorizing about participation and specifically vote choice. In the famous California
car insurance experiment, it was proved “that access to a particular class of widely
available information shortcuts allowed badly informed voters to emulate the
behavior of relatively well informed voters” (Lupia 1994a 63). Essentially, the
effective use of heuristics can almost completely remove any other information
barriers that citizens would otherwise have to traverse in order to vote correctly
(Popkin 1991; Lupia 1994a; Lupia 1994b; Lupia and McCubbins 1998). These
studies focus almost exclusively on vote choice and find that uninformed voters who
use heuristics are able to make the same decisions and vote the same way that
informed voters do. However, it is important that citizens perceive the correct
heuristics as being important, and that the heuristics they choose will make them
perceive that they can vote effectively (Rosenstone and Hansen 1993). For example,
respondents who rank religion as the most important information shortcut used
when considering whom to vote for may have a harder time deciding as Election
Day draws near, as the field is usually comprised of predominantly Protestant
candidates. Heuristics such as party identification and the candidate the
respondent’s friends are voting for may be more useful in narrowing down the field
and picking a candidate that represents the respondent. Therefore the use of these
heuristics may increase the benefit of voting because they make citizens feel like
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their votes are more effective and worthwhile. Citizens who do not realize they can
use information shortcuts or those that use ineffective heuristics for their purposes
may not end up voting because they still have considerable information barriers to
overcome and they may not be invested in their vote because they do not feel
confident in it.
Most of the literature on cognitive heuristics asks questions of whether they
improve the decision-making capabilities of the people using them (Tversky &
Kahneman 1974; Lau & Redlawsk 1997; Lau & Redlawsk 2001; Lau & Redlawsk
2006). The heuristics literature almost exclusively focuses on vote choice, and
political scientists have found that the most common type of information sought out
during campaigns is typically not extensive information on policy stances and other
values, but rather it is information that is shallow and easy to access—essentially
heuristics (Lau and Redlawsk 2006). While heuristics are used most appropriately
by the more politically informed (Lau and Redlawsk 2006) when it comes down to
vote decision, these shortcuts are still ubiquitous and widespread among voters
deciding whom to vote for. Much of the heuristics literature focuses on the effect of
heuristic use on vote choice and ignores the effect it may have on a citizen’s decision
to turn out to vote in the first place. This paper takes a step back from vote choice
and seeks to understand if heuristics help people turn out to vote. If voters and
nonvoters are different in the ways they prioritize and understand various
heuristics, we will gain further understanding of the information barriers blocking
certain people from voting.
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While work by Schaffner, Streb, and Wright (2001) and Schaffner and Streb
(2002) examines the effects that removing partisan labels have on turnout and vote
intention for uneducated voters—they conclude that doing so suppresses turnout
and makes uneducated voters less confident in linking their preferred candidate to a
party—much of the literature on heuristics focuses on their effectiveness on actually
making correct candidate decisions. They take turnout as a given, and the
population of Americans they are studying have already made the decision to turn
out to vote. The aforementioned literature on voter turnout makes it very clear that
turnout is not a given. By leaving out nonvoters, these heuristic studies may
overlook some of the importance of heuristics—their effectiveness in lowering
information barriers that some Americans perceive must be overcome in order to
vote. My research is focused on this potential advantage that heuristics offer.
Perhaps heuristics allow people to actually make the decision to vote in the first
place because they have some information rather than none at all, or they feel that
this information is adequate to participate in democracy effectively. Many
Americans may be torn between the desire to fulfill their civic duty and vote and
their fear of casting an uninformed and irresponsible ballot. The latter norm creates
a stigma for low-information potential voters, which may drive them away from the
polls on Election Day, but heuristics may be the solution for this as they are low-cost
ways to behave as a fully-informed citizen would (Lupia 1994a; Lupia 1994b; Lupia
and McCubbins 1998).
Heuristic-based Turnout
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My theory is not of voter turnout writ large. It does not answer the question
“what makes people vote?” The puzzle that I want to begin to solve is why do some
uninformed people vote while others do not? My theory is concerned with the
information barriers that keep some potential voters from voting. It is a theory
concerned with the conflicting expectations that one should fulfill their civic duty
and vote each election, but that it is harmful to a democracy to vote without
adequate candidate information. My concern is that the latter standard counteracts
the former and results in suppressing voter turnout where it would usually exist. In
a democracy where political interest is at an all time low (Prior 2007) but turnout
rates have remained relatively stable since the 80’s and have even increased over
the past two presidential elections (McDonald-United States Election Project), there
must be many voters who use heuristics in order to make political decisions less
complex (Lau & Redlawsk 1997; Lau & Redlawsk 2001; Lau & Redlawsk 2006). My
theory is that people’s perceptions of the importance of certain heuristics affect
turnout. Nonvoters do not perceive the importance of certain heuristics the same
way voters do. They may prioritize less effective shortcuts that offer less
information and feel that they are unable to make an effective decision and
therefore avoid the voting process altogether.
My research extends the cost-based turnout literature by arguing that some
Americans perceive information to be a cost when it comes to voting. This is obvious
as public opinion data has shown that Americans believe some people should be
excluded from the voting process based on how much information they can acquire
about a given election. I argue that heuristics lower information costs and that they
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can allow relatively uninformed Americans to make the decision to vote because
they believe they know enough about the election to do so. I predict that this effect
will be more prominent among respondents with lower education levels, since they
face higher information cost barriers to voting. Since education is known to be a
strong predictor of turnout, heuristic perceptions may not make a difference for the
turnout rates of the highly educated respondents in our survey. Information is not a
cost to them. They are the segment of the population that always votes no matter
what, and so their ranking of various heuristics will be irrelevant because heuristics
do little to alter the cost of voting for the highly educated.
Heuristics also increase benefits, making it more worthwhile for relatively
uninformed voters to turn out. Because these people might now know something
about the candidates rather than nothing at all, they may feel like their vote is more
effective and important. Again, highly educated respondents probably always feel
that their votes are effective and worthwhile, so heuristics do not offer them any
new benefits to voting. My research is concerned with explaining turnout as a
function of heuristic perceptions and leaves the question of vote choice unanswered
because it is primarily concerned with the information barriers that Americans
perceive they must overcome in order to vote as a result of the information-based
counter-norm, and because there has already been extensive research on vote
choice and heuristics.
I predict that respondents who perceive the vote choice of friends and party
identification to be the most effective information shortcuts will be more likely to
also be voters. This hypothesis is based on the partisan identification literature that
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states that party identification is a social and psychological identity that can be
passed down through families (Campbell, Converse, Miller, & Stokes 1960; Green,
Palmquist, & Schickler 2002) and the aforementioned social theory of voter turnout
(Rolfe 2012; Sinclair 2012). Even if potential voters are not completely informed
about the party platforms and particular issue stances of a given candidate, they
probably identify with an inherited political party and understand the social identity
that goes along with each one (Green et al. 2002). This may allow them to believe
they have enough information to make a vote choice.
As for social heuristics, more politically informed members of certain social
networks may provide campaign- and election-related cues, increasing the salience
of an election in the minds of less informed citizens in these networks and making
them more likely to vote. As many friend and co-worker networks are homogenous,
these less informed citizens may believe they can use the cues from these more
informed network members to make an efficient vote choice, and therefore turn out
to vote when they otherwise may not have because “what people do depends on
what the people around them do” (Rolfe 2012 22; Sinclair 2012). The “friends”
heuristic is therefore also considered an “effective” heuristic because of how
prevalent homogeneity is in social networks and how much information this
shortcut can convey about different candidates to potential voters. If a less-informed
member of a social network knows which candidate their friend is supporting and
that their friend is very similar to them, they may be able to infer that that candidate
would be worth casting a vote for.
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Conversely, I predict that respondents who prioritize less effective heuristics
will not vote. These “less effective” heuristics may include shortcuts that provide
relatively little information about what kind of representative or leader a candidate
is going to be. With regard to the specific survey question used in this paper, these
heuristics would be race, gender, religion, occupation, and endorsement by the local
newspaper. For example, respondents may prioritize race or gender as the most
important piece of information when deciding whom to vote for, and then have very
little information in elections when the entire field is made up of white men. While
one may be able to infer leadership skills or legal experience from a candidate’s
occupation, it is not necessarily a useful decision making aid as many candidates
have similar jobs—incumbent politicians, lawyers, business men and women, etc.
An ineffective heuristic is therefore a shortcut that offers little information or one
that cannot ultimately aid the decision-making process, and I predict that there will
be an association between the rankings of these ineffective heuristics and a lack of
turnout.
Before testing my hypotheses it is important to consider other variables that
may affect both turnout and perceptions of the effectiveness of various heuristics.
Education has always been a strong predictor of turnout, and there will most likely
be an association between education and the perceived importance of various
heuristics in my analysis. More highly educated Americans are usually the ones who
are more interested in politics or have more experience voting and therefore can
better understand which heuristics will typically be most useful in an election
environment. For example, they may understand that the party identification
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heuristic is extremely effective in substituting for information they could have
learned had they been watching the news and researching the candidates during the
entire span of the election. However as was previously mentioned, the rankings of
heuristics will matter less for the highly educated because they are more likely to
turn out in general. Conversely, less educated Americans may prioritize heuristics
that offer much less relevant information in an election and are less useful in making
a vote choice. These people may feel that a candidate’s race, gender, or religion are
the most important decision-making aids available in an election and find
themselves unable to decide when both candidates are white Protestant males. Not
having much more information than this may deter potential voters because the
cost of voting has not been sufficiently lowered and there are still barriers to be
crossed. However, when uneducated, low-information respondents perceive
effective heuristics to be important, we will likely see an increase in voter turnout in
this educational demographic, because of lowered costs and increased benefits.
Partisanship is also a factor that affects turnout and will most likely affect the
perceived importance of certain heuristics, for “few factors are of greater
importance for our national elections than the lasting attachment of tens of millions
of Americans to one of the parties. These loyalties establish a basic division of
electoral strength within which the competition of particular campaigns takes place”
(Campbell et. al 1960 121). Partisanship is strongly associated with turnout
(Campbell et. al 1960; Bartels 2000) as “strong partisans who care about election
outcomes are more likely to vote than weak partisans or independents who care
less about the results” (Rolfe 2012 1). Partisans may feel more interest, passion, and
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conviction about the issues in an election due not only to their party loyalties but
also their core beliefs, which are usually inherited through generations (Green et. al
2002). Independents may not turn out in such high numbers because their
ideological beliefs may vary depending on different issues, and they are therefore
less sure about whom to vote for and may feel that they need to overcome more
information barriers in order to vote effectively. When considering voting for a
person who usually represents a consistent ideology and party platform, many
Independents must do a lot more research than partisans in order to feel like their
vote is serving their interests. Their information barriers are higher. Therefore we
can imagine that the perceived usefulness of the partisan heuristic will also vary
along levels of partisan strength. The party identification heuristic will probably be
a vital decision making aid for people who identify as Republicans or Democrats, but
will probably be less useful for Independents.
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CHAPTER III
DATA AND METHODS
The data necessary to answer the question of the relationship between
various heuristic perceptions and voter turnout comes from a 2012 Cooperative
Congressional Election Study (CCES) survey of 55,400 Americans, on a module
created by the University of Massachusetts Amherst (Ansolabehere & Schaffner
2013) which had 1,000 respondents. YouGov administered the survey through
matched random sampling, in which they selected members of their large opt-in
panels who had matching characteristics (gender, race, age, education, ideology,
party identification, etc.) to each individual selected in a target random sample of
the American adult population. This method is effective because it allows YouGov to
offer a sample population that matches the target population in the American
electorate on key characteristics, which allows us to make inferences that span
beyond the respondents in our survey (Schaffner 2011). The exact phrasing of the
question is as follows:
“If you had to vote in an election but did not know any of the candidates
competing, which pieces of information would be most useful for
helping
you decide who to vote for?”
Rank in 7 slots
 The political party of the candidate
 The candidate that was endorsed by the local newspaper
 The occupation of each candidate
 The gender of each candidate
 The race of each candidate
 Which candidate your friends support
 The religion of each candidate
The options were randomized to prevent respondent bias in the order of the
options. Although the question identifies the options as “pieces of information”, it is
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important to remember that heuristics are more like information shortcuts that can
represent more in-depth information. Heuristics are much more than just “pieces of
information” because they are the mechanisms through which people are
cognitively able to access and infer deeper information than what each heuristic
suggests or offers. Being labeled a Republican is not just a label or simply a form of
identification. It means the candidate most likely supports small government, states’
rights, and gun rights and promotes the interests of big business while they
probably oppose abortion, open borders, and expansion of marriage rights to the
lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender (LGBT) community. Many Americans can infer all
of this information and more from a simple party label. However, since many
respondents would not know the term “heuristics”, it was necessary to call the
options “pieces of information” in the question.
Although this question offers a clear look at which heuristics respondents
perceive are most useful in deciding whom to vote for in an election, one weakness
is that we are unable to understand exactly which heuristics were used in the
information processing method before each respondent made the decision to vote.
Another weakness in this question is that turnout is a given, leading with the phrase
“if you had to vote . . .” This forces the respondent to imagine an election-day voting
environment and to answer accordingly. However this question is primarily
concerned with heuristic perceptions rather than heuristic use, and while each
respondent answered as if they were definitely in a voting environment, the survey
includes a validated vote measurement, which allowed me to see the turnout
distribution among respondents, and turnout certainly was not guaranteed in
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reality. We can therefore measure the two variables critical to this question:
perceptions of heuristics and voter turnout. So this question, while imperfect, is
appropriate to begin to answer the question at hand.
When it came to operationalizing the heuristic ranking variables, the
heuristic rankings were already coded within the dataset to be divided by heuristic
with indication of how many respondents ranked each heuristic on a usefulness
scale of 1-7. Therefore each heuristic became its own shortcut variable in Stata
whose codebook would show the distribution of rankings in spots 1-7. I combined
both desktop and mobile online responses to get access every respondent’s answers
within each variable. I ended up with seven heuristic ranking variables: “party
identification” shortcut, “friend” shortcut, “job” shortcut, “endorse” shortcut, “race”
shortcut, “religion” shortcut, and “gender” shortcut. To create a variable for turnout
I coded the validated vote variable so that surveys that “Matched No Vote” and
respondents who openly admitted not voting were coded as 0 and those surveys
whose votes were validated were coded as 1. Out of 1,000 total module
respondents, 983 had validated vote data so 983 became the final sample size. I then
ran a logistic regression with turnout as the dependent variable and each shortcut
as independent variables. The test was set up this way to understand how changes
in the ranking of each heuristic affected the changes in turnout rates. In my model I
included controls for race, age, gender, education, partisan strength, party
identification, and ideology in order to avoid the risk of getting false or exaggerated
findings from a confounding variable I did not include in the model. For example, if I
did not include race in the model then coefficients for the ranking of the race

24

heuristic may have been much higher. It was important to start with a simple
logistic regression model in order to get preliminary findings and understand which
variables show a statistically significant association with turnout. These results are
presented in Table 1 in the Results and Analysis section below.
It was previously discussed that both education and partisan strength affect
turnout and can possibly have an effect on the types of heuristics that respondents
prioritize. In order to account for these possibilities, I ran interaction models
between the party identification heuristic, education, and turnout as well as the
“friendship” heuristic, education, and turnout, with controls for race and partisan
strength. The results are presented in Figure 2, and Figure 3 below and in Table A1
in Appendix A. In order to rule out the possibility of the party identification heuristic
acting as a proxy for partisan strength predicting turnout, I also ran separate logistic
regression models sorting by partisan strength to assess the effect of the party
identification heuristic and the “friend” heuristic ranking on turnout, and these
results are presented in Table 3 below.
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CHAPTER IV
RESULTS AND ANALYSIS
Out of the seven heuristics I tested with regard to their effect on voter
turnout, only the party identification and “friendship” heuristics proved to have a
statistically significant effect or marginally significant effect, as shown below in
Table 1. While there were also positive turnout associations with the occupation
heuristic and negative associations with the race, gender, newspaper endorsement,
and religion heuristics as I hypothesized, the results were not statistically or
marginally significant.
Table 1: Estimation Results: Logistic Regression
Variable
Candidate’s party
identification
Candidate a friend voted for
Candidate endorsed by local
newspaper
Candidate’s occupation
Candidate’s race
Candidate’s religion
Race
Age
Education
Partisan strength
Gender
Ideology
Party identification
Constant

Coefficient
.30

Standard Error
.10

.17
.09

.09
.09

-.17
-.04
-.03
.04
.02
.15
.26
-.14
.02
-.02
-2.47

.11
.12
.09
.11
.01
.08
.18
.22
.15
.22
1.26

Table 1. Shows the results of a logistic regression between the dependent variable turnout and the
independent variables—the various heuristics. Note: the gender heuristic was automatically omitted
from analysis because of collinearity. P-values for the partisan heuristic ranking and friendship
heuristic ranking were .005 and .06, respectively. N=983

As for our statistically significant variables: Table 2 below shows the mean
turnout rate for respondents who ranked each heuristic in a given slot from 1-7.
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This table provides a clear visual that there is an association between where
respondents rank certain heuristics and their likelihood to turn out to vote. While it
presents the findings for every heuristic included in the survey question it is
important to keep in mind that only the party identification and the “friendship”
heuristics are statistically or marginally significant when controlling for other
factors. Table 2 shows that the party identification heuristic and the “friendship”
heuristic also show substantively significant differences between the turnout rates
of respondents who ranked each heuristic first versus those who ranked them last.
People who rank the partisan identification heuristic as the most useful “piece of
information” (ranked first) they would use if they did not have any other candidate
information are 30% more likely to vote than those who rank the party
identification heuristic as the least useful heuristic (ranked seventh). Respondents
who consider which candidate their friend supports to be the most important “piece
of information” are 25% more likely to vote than those who ranked it the least
important.
Table 2: Mean Turnout According to Each Heuristic Ranking
Ranking
Ranked
1st
Ranked
2nd
Ranked
3rd
Ranked
4th
Ranked
5th
Ranked
6th
Ranked
7th

Party
identification
84%

Friend

Endorsement

Occupation

Gender

Race

Religion

88%

60%

71%

29%

72%

77%

79%

87%

76%

82%

62%

53%

75%

72%

82%

80%

82%

70%

82%

78%

56%

76%

74%

87%

82%

75%

88%

73%

74%

81%

85%

82%

69%

81%

57%

78%

82%

53%

78%

84%

75%

53%

63%

88%

87%

83%

80%

76%
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Table 2. Shows the mean turnout rate for respondents who rank each heuristic from 1-7. A rank of 1
is high, while a rank of 7 is low. N=983

With the association between rankings of these heuristics and turnout being
such a substantive finding, I decided to look further into how the ranking of these
heuristics interacts with another important predictor of turnout: education. While
education cannot be used as a proxy for political information or sophistication,
scholars have shown that higher levels of education are related to higher levels of
voter turnout (Wolfinger and Rosenstone 1980; Lassen 2005), so it is worth
understanding if there is a relationship between education and ranking of the party
identification heuristic. The purpose is to test that more educated people are not the
only ones who are able to perceive effective heuristics to be useful, because then
heuristic ranking would be a proxy for the effect that education has on turnout. I
also tested for interaction effects between turnout, ranking of each heuristic, and
news interest, but there were no significant effects for this variable. The relationship
between turnout, the party identification heuristic ranking, the friend heuristic, and
education can be found in Figures 1 and 2, and the model tables can be found in
Appendix A.
Figure 2: Turnout: Party Identification Heuristic Ranking and Education
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Figure 2. Shows the relationship between turnout, party identification ranking, and education levels
controlling for race, partisan strength, and party identification.

Figure 2 is interesting because it shows the importance of perceptions of the party
identification rankings for less educated respondents. According to Figure 2, turnout
is pretty steady among respondents with at least a two-year college degree.
However, the ranking of the party identification heuristic become much more
important as education levels decrease. A person who did not complete high school
who perceives the party identification heuristic to be the least useful has around a
30% probability of turning out, while a person with the same level of education who
ranks this heuristic the highest has a 80% probability of turning out. Thus heuristics
matter more for people with lower levels of education, because people with high
levels of education turn out at equal levels regardless of where they rank the
partisan identification heuristic. The ranking is not a proxy for the effect of
education. We see a similar effect in Figure 3 with regard to the “friendship”
heuristic.
Figure 3: Turnout: Friendship Heuristic Ranking and Education
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Figure 3. Shows the relationship between turnout, the “friendship” heuristic ranking, and education
levels controlling for race, partisan strength, and party identification.

Figures 2 and 3 show the importance of the perceptions or rankings of each
heuristic for uneducated respondents. While there are interaction effects between
the rankings of each heuristic and the education variable, one is not substituting for
the other because the effects of heuristic ranking on voter turnout vary greatly
according to education level. Each graph shows that the actual ranking of each
heuristic matters most for respondents without a high school diploma. Due to the
information-rich nature of the party identification heuristic and the link to
homogenous social networks that the “friendship” heuristic offers, these heuristics
are highly effective in conveying valuable information about the candidates. If
people without a high school diploma perceive these heuristics to be the most
important “piece of information” they can find about a candidate, they are almost
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just as likely to vote as people with a Bachelor’s degree or higher. This finding is
important because it reinforces previous studies on heuristics that focused on vote
choice and Election Day behavior and took turnout as a given.
As for the role of partisan strength in this question, it is worth noting that the
party identification heuristic is only associated with turnout when respondents
identified as either a weak or strong partisan. The heuristic was not useful for
people who leaned toward one party or who considered themselves Independent.
The results of the logistic regression for turnout, the party identification heuristic,
and the friendship sorted by strength of partisanship are shown in Table 5 below.
Table 3: Turnout: Party Identification Heuristic Sorted by Partisan Strength

Party identification
heuristic
Friendship heuristic
Race
Education
Constant

Independent

Leaner

.17
(.14)
.18
(.14)
.14
(.22)
.38
(.18)
-2.27
(1.15)

.08
(.17)
-.24
(.13)
-.22
(.13)
.18
(.14)
1.50
(1.32)

Weak
partisan
.40*
(.14)
.42*
(.13)
-.16
(.22)
.26
(.16)
-3.33
(1.19)

Strong
partisan
.47*
(.13)
.09
(.09)
0.002
(.16)
.02
(.11)
-1.81
(1.00)

Table 3. Shows the impact of the ranking of the party identification heuristic and friendship heuristic
on voter turnout according to varying levels of partisan strength. The partisan heuristic p-value for
weak partisans is .003, for strong partisans it is less than .001. For the friendship heuristic
association with weak partisans, the p-value is .001. This model controls for race and education
because they are associated with turnout. Partisan strength was not included as a control in this
model because it is included as a sorting mechanism to understand how the data varies across levels
of partisan strength.

It was also important to understand how the ranking of the friend heuristic differed
across varying levels of partisan strength, in order to understand if some
respondents fell back on that heuristic when they no longer perceived that the
partisan strength heuristic would be useful. The ranking of the friendship heuristic
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is only associated with turnout when respondents identified as weak partisans.
Therefore respondents in the other levels of partisan strength probably value other
heuristics more heavily than the friendship heuristic.
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CHAPTER V
IMPLICATIONS AND CONCLUSION
Implications
Party identification and considering the candidate one’s friend is supporting
are both extremely important and informative heuristics when it comes to
increasing turnout among the electorate. When people perceive these heuristics to
be the most important “pieces of information” they can use in a voting environment,
they are much more likely to vote than if they perceive them to be one of the least
important heuristics. However, even the strength of these powerful heuristics
cannot fully overcome the importance of education in predicting turnout. At almost
every heuristic rank, people who had less education than the level above them were
also less likely to turn out (however this is not the case for people without a high
school diploma who ranked the “friendship” heuristic as the most important—they
actually eclipse the people with a college degree who ranked it similarly). This
almost uniform education gap may be because education is also related to income,
and the resource model of turnout that relies heavily on SES is still pervasive today,
preventing people from taking time off of work to vote or acquiring the resources
necessary to completely make up for their lack of education. People who have
higher levels of education usually consequently have higher SES, and therefore may
be more interested in politics because they have more free time to invest in learning
about politics (Prior 2007). If this is the case, it is concerning for the health of
American democracy because it likely confirms that representation favors the
people who are monetarily able to afford to vote. However, one cannot ignore the
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fact that the use of heuristics can help uneducated voters turn out in almost equal
numbers to voters with advanced college degrees, in the same way that heuristics
help uninformed voters make the same vote choices as more politically informed
voters (Popkin 1991; Lupia 1994a; Lupia 1994b; Lupia and McCubbins 1998).
Conclusion
This paper focused on the ranking of the party identification and “friendship”
heuristics because of their significance in the data analysis and because of their
important variations when sorted by education levels. Overall this study has been a
win for heuristics. When used properly, they can almost completely even the playing
field among voters of various educational backgrounds. Scholars of American
politics still have much to learn about the role that heuristics play in voter turnout.
Voting as a civic duty has been a normative principle for much of American history,
and lack of political information among the electorate has been studied for years,
yet the concept of using information shortcuts and decision-making aids with regard
to turnout has not been studied. This paper only considers seven heuristics during
one election. There are many more heuristics to be considered. Heuristics such as a
candidate’s leadership qualities, a candidate’s education, a candidate’s speaking
skills, incumbency, and even their looks, are often cited as reasons people vote for
certain candidates. Research on these heuristics is in the same state as the research
on the heuristics considered in this paper—it concerns vote choice and treats
turnout as a given. Future research may look into these heuristics’ effect on turnout.
It would be interesting for future research to test Americans’ information barriers
with regards to more varied heuristics, in order to understand more completely just
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how much information and what type of information Americans think is necessary
to vote.
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APPENDIX
INTERACTION EFFECTS MODEL
Table A.1: Interaction Effects: Turnout, Party Identification Heuristic,
Friend Heuristic, and Education
Party identification
heuristic
Education
Party ID heuristic,
education
Friend heuristic
Friend heuristic, education
Race
Partisan strength
Party identification
Constant

Coefficient
.48

Standard Error
.15

.99
-.10

.45
.06

.27
-.07
-.02
.34
.24
-4.21

.13
.05
.10
.16
.18
1.23

Table A1. Shows the interaction effects between education and the ranking of the party
identification heuristic or between education and the ranking of the friend heuristic in their effect on
turnout. These are the results of a logistic regression model. The p-value for the partisan heuristic
was .001, for the friendship heuristic it was .04. The p-values for the interactions between the
partisan heuristic and education and the friendship heuristic and education were both .13. N=983
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